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Herd behavior in sales launch: an empirical study of the  




This paper examines the herd behavior in sales launch decisions by developers in China’s 
housing market. Using a sample of 6,930 development projects from 1997 to 2009, we find 
that the propensity of sales launch is positively related to the number of prior sales launches 
within a certain distance. This effect is more pronounced when the time interval between 
sales dates is shorter and when the distance is shorter. Furthermore, lead projects that are 
developed by reputable developers have a greater influence on later developers’ decisions 
than non-reputable ones. These findings provide evidence of herd behavior in developers’ 
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Sales launch decisions are important in the real estate market. On the supply side, 
developers rushing to sell at the same time will cause a higher housing supply in the short 
term. Excess supply can drag down real estate prices. On the demand side, the “fallacy of a 
boom market” caused by excessive sales and marketing activities would affect market 
sentiment. When the investors become optimistic about the housing market, they tend to 
invest more in the market, pushing the housing price up. Therefore, the timing of a 
developer’s sales launch can influence housing price, stock volatility, and stability of housing 
market.  
There are many factors that can influence a developer’s sales launch strategy. Some 
developers launch public sales only after the completion of construction. With the presale 
system, developers often sell before construction completion, and even before construction 
commencement. It gives developers more operating capital during development and better 
flexibility to respond to the market. However, it makes it harder for investors and 
policymakers to estimate the effect of sales launch. Understanding the timing of sales launch 
is of significant importance. Do developers make sales launch decisions solely based on the 
market situation and their own development plans? Or can they also be influenced by other 
developers?  
This paper follows prior studies in strategic decisions and herd behavior. In the fields of 
economics and finance, herd behavior has been widely analyzed. The reasons that cause 
herd behavior are mainly information and reputation. For instance, Bikhchandani and 
Sharma (2000) find that investors with similar profit-maximizing goals and similar information 
tend to react similarly at the same time. Trueman (1994) finds that reputation-concerned 
analysts tend to release similar earnings forecasts as announced by other analysts before, 
even though it is not consistent with their own information. In real estate literature, herding is 
observed when developers make development decisions. Decoster and Strange (2012) use 
statistical herding to explain the causes of overbuilding. In their paper, developers learn from 
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their predecessors. If inaccurate signals are spread, the following developers will still believe 
in the wrong signal and ignore their own information, thus causing overbuilding. 
In this paper, we use a sample of residential development in China from 1997 to 2009. We 
examine the timing of developers’ sales launch. The results from hazard proportional model 
show that there is an evident herd behavior among developers. First, given a certain time 
period and distance, the propensity of new sales launch is positively related to the number of 
prior sales launches. To be more specific, for a typical developer, an increase in the number 
of prior sales launches in the past 3 months within a 5-mile radius can increase the 
probability of his sales launch by 1.2%.  
Next, we conduct a few robustness tests using different combinations of time intervals 
between sales launch dates and of distances between projects sites. Results show that the 
influence of predecessors is greater when the time interval between two public sales dates is 
shorter and when the distance between two project sites is shorter. Lastly, we take 
reputation into consideration and test whether more reputable developers have greater 
influence than less-reputable ones. Results show that if the predecessor is from the list of 
“Top 500 Real Estate Developers in China”, its sales launch decisions can accelerate the 
follower’s sales launch decisions by 6.1%. Results suggest similar conclusions for 
developers that are public firms. 
Examining different subsamples, the results show that the herd behavior is more 
pronounced if the projects are located in more developed cities. The developers tend to herd 
more when there are with higher reputation concerns. Compared with projects developed in 
multiple phases, herd behavior is more significant within single-phase projects, possibly 
because they are faced with higher demand uncertainty. 
The contribution of this paper is mainly in three aspects. First, there are few existing studies 
analyzing the herd behavior in sales launch decisions in the Chinese housing market except 
Lai et al. (2009). Second, instead of examining the developers’ strategies in only one city 
(e.g. Tang and Wang, 2017) or several cities (e.g. Huang, 2014), it uses a large sample size 
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with a time span of 13 years covering 49 cities, showing a more universal and reliable 
pattern nationwide. The Chinese housing market is also a good representative of emerging 
markets. Finally, as a strategic focus in China’s economic development, the real estate 
industry is of crucial importance. Understanding the sales launch pattern of developers is 
very helpful for policymakers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the existing 
literature on real estate development strategy, sales strategy, and herd behavior. Section 3 
proposes the hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the methodology used in this paper. Section 
5 shows the empirical results of the hypotheses and further robustness tests. Section 6 
presents the conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Strategic Decisions by Developers 
The majority of prior studies on developers’ strategic decisions focuses on development and 
sales. Unlike other financial markets, real estate market has poor liquidity (Shiller, 1994), 
more private information and information noises (Grenadier, 1999; Childs et al., 2002; Tang 
and Wang, 2017). On one hand, developers want to seize market opportunities when the 
housing demand increases; on the other hand, they do not want to overestimate market 
demand and end up with vacant apartments and outstanding loans. Thus, it is essential that 
developers make strategic development decisions and sales decisions. 
One popular development strategy is to hold the development decisions until more 
information is observed in the housing market. Many scholars model the real estate 
development as a real option and call it “option to wait”. For example, by examining why lots 
of valuable urban land was kept vacant in Los Angeles, Titman (1985) finds that under high 
uncertainty in real estate market, developers are better off holding their development 
decisions and waiting for additional information before any actions are taken. Quigg (1993) 
confirms the idea that “the option to wait has value” by analyzing a large sample of real 
 4 
estate transactions in Seattle and in his paper, the premia associated with option (time) is 6% 
of the land value. Somerville (2001) considers building permits in his paper and he 
concludes while builders may obtain their permits first, their decisions of exercising the 
permits change with new information, which is consistent with the “real option” theory. Bulan 
et al. (2009) also find significant evidence that uncertainty delays development strategy 
using Vancouver condominiums data. In their paper, the probability of investment drops 13 
percent with one-standard deviation increase in return volatility. 
One key factor that can affect the “option to wait” development strategy is competition. 
Williams (1993) concludes that since the supply of options is limited, the developers are 
imperfectly competitive. The imperfect competition among developers greatly decreases the 
value of options, leading to an earlier exercise of options. Grenadier (2002) argues that with 
competition, a typical firm cannot realize the full option premium by waiting to develop. This 
makes developers exercise their options sooner because the preemption of its competitor 
will diminish the value of options. Bulan et al. (2009) show that competition reduces the 
effect of volatility on development decisions. In their paper, return volatility leads to a decline 
in new construction, while the competition around makes the decline in construction less 
sensitive to volatility. Wang et al. (2016) find the same pattern by analyzing Chinese real 
estate market. Their empirical results show that competition will influence the effect of 
uncertainty on investment timing and accelerate the investment. 
When it comes to sales strategies, many Asian countries and regions adopt the presale 
strategy. In the presale strategy, a developer can launch public sales before completion of 
construction, or even before commencement of construction. In this way, developers can 
secure buyers of uncompleted dwellings and homebuyers can get housing price security, 
both consumers and developers benefit from presale contracts (Edelstein et al., 2012). 
Besides, the equity from presales can be injected into development and reduce financing 
costs, solving developers’ financing constraint problem (Chan et al., 2008). Thus, the presale 
system has been widely applied in Asian countries and regions, especially in Hong Kong, 
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Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Mainland China. It is becoming popular in North 
America and Europe as well. 
Some scholars examine the patterns of presale strategies. For instance, Lai and Wang 
(1999) find the developers in Hong Kong usually presell their housing units one year before 
construction completion. Developers react promptly to a boom market by marketing the 
presale units immediately. Lai et al. (2004) consider a presale contract as a European option. 
The results in their paper show that a presale is superior to selling upon completion. When 
launching a presale is an option, developers should do so as soon as possible. Chan et al. 
(2008) find that in a market with nascent financing system, developers are more willing to 
take the advantage of presale and pursue aggressive strategies. Because in this way, the 
cash associated with downpayments can be invested in their projects, providing them with 
cost-saving efficiency.  
2.2 Informational herding and reputation 
Herding behavior is widely studied in economics and finance literature. The rationale behind 
it is that decision makers with similar information, facing similar decision choices and payoffs, 
tend to make similar decisions, therefore causing a behavioral convergence (Brown et al., 
2006).  
Information is one of the key reasons that causes herd behavior. Banerjee (1992) develops a 
sequential decision model to show the rationale behind herd behavior. In his theory, a typical 
agent tends to follow the decision made by most agents regardless of his own information. 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) find that investors with similar profit-maximizing goals and 
similar information tend to react similarly at the same time. In an emerging financial market 
with weak reporting requirements and higher information acquisition costs, information 
cascade is more likely to arise. Chiang and Zheng (2010) find that herding activity exists in 
both advanced financial markets (except for the U.S.) and Asian markets, exists in both up 
and down markets, and is more profound in rising Asian markets. Information also brings 
“payoff externalities”. Choi (1997) finds that the payoff externalities and information spillover 
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together generate herding in the choice of technology. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) 
also conclude that one’s payoff can somehow depend on other decision makes’ choices by 
analyzing risk disclosure regime. Zhang and Liu (2012) find the same pattern in microloan 
markets. One lender can estimate the creditworthiness by observing other lenders’ decisions, 
therefore causing socially-correlated lending decisions.  
Except for information, reputation also plays an important role in herd behavior. Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990) use group psychology to explain herd behavior among managers. In some 
cases, managers simply mimic other managers’ investment decisions and ignore their own 
private information. It seems inefficient but it does make sense. With reputational concerns, 
managers don’t want contrarian behavior to damage their reputation as sensible managers, 
so they choose what most managers choose to “share the blame”. Trueman (1994) also 
finds that reputation-concerned analysts tend to release similar earnings forecasts as 
announced by other analysts before, even though it’s not consistent with their private 
information. Kauffman and Li (2003) analyze the scenario under IT adoption. They conclude 
that IT managers imitate other managers’ action because they believe by doing so, other 
people will have a positive impression on their capabilities. Therefore, they have an incentive 
to make decisions that are not in the interest of their firms, causing agency costs. 
Herd behavior is observed in real estate markets too. Grenadier (1996) finds an abnormal 
construction boom during a recession (recession-induced construction boom). When the 
market starts to erode, developers simultaneously choose to start their buildings. He refers 
to the rapid succession of exercise strategies as “development cascades”. The followers, 
even though they cannot benefit from the leading space without competition, can benefit 
from the information conveyed by the leader, and therefore have a better understanding of 
the value of their buildings with less costs. Chu and Sing (2007) find the explanation for short 
bursts and overbuilding under asymmetric duopoly. They conclude that when the relative 
price function is smaller between two developers, the preemptive threat is more critical. 
Decoster and Strange (2012) use statistical herding to explain overbuilding. In their paper, 
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developers learn from their predecessors. If inaccurate signals are spread, the following 
developers will still believe in the wrong signal and ignore their own information, causing 
overbuilding. Povel et al. (2016) examine why hotels are built in booms using U.S. hotel 
industry data. They find that the decision to build a hotel is made under great uncertainty 
about future demand, so the builders rely heavily on information from other participants and 
peers in the industry. This finding is consistent with information-based herding explanations. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Based on the existing literature, we expect to see a behavioral convergence in developers 
launching public sales when developers believe those developers who previously launched 
sales convey a positive signal about the real estate market (e.g. that there is a burst in 
housing demand). When the number of public sales launches within a certain time period 
and distance increases, an average developer tends to “follow” predecessors’ decisions and 
adjust his sales schedules too, trying to “catch up” with other developers. Thus, the first 
hypothesis is: 
H1: Given a certain time period and distance, the propensity of a new sales launch is 
positively related to the number of prior sales launches. 
Intuitively, an event that is more recent and within a shorter distance may have greater 
influence. Because the long-term housing demand and market situation probably do not 
significantly affect short-term changes in demand for a new project, the timing of decision-
making is important. Besides, neighboring projects that share similar geographic and cultural 
characteristics also likely face similar market demand. So the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: The positive relation in H1 is larger when the time period is shorter and the 
distance is shorter. 
Though the incentives for managers to herd are similar, the value of the information spillover 
and the influence of actions may be different among firms. Shiller (1995) finds that herd 
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behavior differs across groups. If the information comes from someone reliable, then people 
tend to accept and spread the information more quickly. Generally speaking, a more 
reputable firm has a greater influence on the market and gains more trust on the market. 
Therefore, we expect to see that a typical developer believes the information conveyed by a 
more reputable firm is more valuable and tends to herd more according to the sales actions 
from more reputational firms. Thus: 
H3: The positive relation in H1 is larger when the prior projects are from reputable 
developers. 
4. Methodology 
We use survival analysis to test the above hypothesis on the timing of sales launches. 
Survival analysis examines the probability that an event happens, which in this paper, is the 
probability that a new real estate project launches public sales. Compared to OLS, survival 
analysis has several advantages. First, it can correctly incorporate information from both 
censored and uncensored data to estimate the parameters of the model. Hence it will not 
cause a sample selection bias. Second, it does not require an assumption that the 
observations are normally distributed, which is almost impossible for the outcome variable, 
time. Third, it can handle time-varying data that change values during the observation period. 
Lastly, it captures the sequential effect, which is perfect to explain the herd behavior in this 
paper (Cleves et al., 2004).  
4.1 Survival function 
In survival analysis, the outcome variable is the time until an event of interest happens. Let ! 
be a non-negative random continuous time until the occurrence of an event. If an event 
happens during time ", it is called a “failure”, otherwise it is said to “survive”. Given the 
notions above, the survival function is defined as: 
#(") = '((" ≤ !) 
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measuring the probability that an event does not happen (survives) during time ". Here in 
this paper, the survival function shows the probability that a typical real estate project does 
not launch public sales during time ". Accordingly, the failure function is defined as: 
*(") = '((! < ") = 1 − #(") = .(")/"01   
where .(") is its probability density function of *("). It measures the probability that an event 
happens (fails) during time ". In this paper, the failure function shows the probability that a 
real estate project launches public sales during time ".  
4.2 Cox proportional hazards model 
A survival function analyzes the probability an event happens, while a hazard model 
measures the potential that an event will happen based on the condition that it has survived 
up to the specific time ". The hazard model is defined as: 
ℎ(") = 34560→1 (" ≤ ! < " + 9"|! ≥ ")9"  
where ℎ(") is the hazard rate of the event. It is a conditional probability that the event occurs 
between interval [", " + 9"] given that it has not occurred before. In this paper, the hazard 
rate of a real estate project at time " means the probability that it launches public sales given 
that it has not launched public sales until time ". 
In 1972, Dr. Cox introduced the proportional hazard model. In this model, the hazard rate is 
defined as: 
ℎ("|<=) = ℎ1(")>?@{<=B}  
where ℎ1(") is called the “baseline hazard function”, <= is the vector of covariates and B is 
the conformable vector of parameters. In this model, the hazard rate of an event at time " is 
the product of the baseline hazard function and the exponential function of the linear 
combination of the covariates.  
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The benefit of the Cox proportional hazard model is that it is a semi-parametric model that 
imposes no assumption on the shape of the baseline hazard function. It also makes the 
interpretation of the parameters more straight-forward. The exponential of parameter B= 
represents the expected change in the hazard ratio (the ratio of two hazard rates) given 
there is a one unit change in variable <=, holding all other predictors constant. Thus the 
effect of the predictors is independent from time " and is proportional over time. So in this 
paper, by interpreting each parameter B=, we can capture the effect it has on the propensity 
for a real estate project to launch public sales and the extent to which it affects the 
propensity. 
5. Data and variable construction  
In this paper, we focus on the Chinese real estate market. China has experienced a surging 
period that is still continuing today. Taking China as an example can provide a better 
understanding of developers’ decision-making behavior in an emerging market. The data is 
obtained from the GTA CSMAR database. The initial dataset comprises construction and 
transaction information of 29,068 real estate projects in 70 major cities from August 1990 to 
November 2010. Variables include construction date, completion date, public sales date, 
project location, selling price, and project-level characteristics (property type, plot ratio, gross 
floor area, etc.).  
The requirements for presales differ among countries and regions. According to the Urban 
Real Estate Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, as of January 1, 1995, a 
real estate developer is allowed to take an advanced sale (presale) only when the “funds put 
for construction of the houses for advanced sale have exceeded 25% of the total budgetary 
investment for the project”. For a real estate developer in China, the cost of real estate 
development includes the cost of land requisition, expenses for pre-construction engineering, 
construction and installation, infrastructural projects and supplementary public utilities, and 
indirect project expenses. Usually, the cost of land requisition accounts for 20% of the total 
cost and the pre-construction engineering expenses account for 6% of the total cost. 
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Therefore, in this paper, we assume a real estate developer is legally allowed to launch 
public sales as long as the construction starts.  
The outcome variable is the time a project takes from construction commencement to the 
launching of public sales. Projects with missing public sales dates are excluded. There are 
quite a few observations with completion dates but without commencement dates. To 
preserve number of observations, we fill up the missing values with the median estimated 
based on projects with the same completion year. We also exclude data from Hong Kong 
because of the social system differences with mainland China. 
We exclude projects which are for office-use only and commercial-use only, while including 
residential projects and mixed-use development. Projects with a sales date before 
construction commencement date are excluded. We also exclude 15 projects with sales 
dates before 1997 (2 projects in 1993, 6 projects in 1995 and 7 projects in 1996) because 
the annual sample size is too small, which may cause an outlier problem. 
After data cleaning, we are left with a full sample of 6,930 projects in 49 cities from January 
1997 to December 2009. Figure 1 shows the number of projects and the average selling 
price of the projects in this paper on an annual basis. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In 1997, China’s real estate industry was in a recession because of the Asian financial crisis. 
To stimulate real estate economy, in 1998, the central government declared “The Notice of 
State Council on Further Deepening the Reform to Urban Housing System and Speeding up 
the Housing Construction”. It marks the end of the welfare system and the beginning of the 
commoditization of residential real estate. Since 1998, the real estate sector has been 
identified as a strategic focus of China's economic development (Xu and Chen, 2012) and 
China entered an era of housing market boom (Chen and Wen, 2014). Figure 1 shows that 
most of the commencement of sales in this paper happened between 1999 and 2008, thus 
the data can capture the features of China’s real estate market as a surging market. Though 
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the annual housing price in the full sample experienced a decline from 1997 to 2000 and 
another modest decline from 2004 to 2007, the overall trend of the housing price is 
increasing. 
We define the outcome variable as the number of months a project takes from construction 
commencement to the launching of public sales, denoted by TIME_TO_SALE. The test 
variables and key control variables are defined as follows: 
Herd behavior. To test Hypothesis 1, we examine whether the propensity for a new project 
to launch public sales is influenced by the number of nearby projects that launched public 
sales before it. In other words, when it is a time period where many real estate managers are 
deciding to sell their projects, we examine whether the manager of a typical project will 
“follow” them. The herd behavior is measured by the variable SALES_COUNT which defines 
the number of projects that launch public sales before project 4 in the previous 3 months and 
within a 5-mile radius.  
Reputation. To test hypothesis 3, we distinguish a general real estate developer from a 
reputable real estate developer. Based on the variable SALES_COUNT, we create the 
variable TOP500_COUNT which defines the number of developers that are on the list of 
“Top 500 Real Estate Developers in China” according to the China Real Estate Association. 
We also create the variable PUBLIC_COUNT which defines the number of developers that 
are public firms. To be more specific, TOP500_COUNT represents the number of projects 
from the top 500 real estate developers that launch public sales before project 4 in the 
previous 3 months and within a 5-mile radius; PUBLIC_COUNT represents the number of 
projects from public firms that launch public sales before project 4 in the previous 3 months 
and within a 5-mile radius. In this paper, we assume that a public real estate developer is 
more reputable and has greater influence than a top 500 real estate developer. 
Information transparency. CBNweekly classifies Chinese cities into different tiers based on 
their commercial resources clustering, activities of citizens, the varieties of people’s lifestyles, 
and future development potential. A higher-tier city means it is more developed, is more 
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attractive to business, and has a more active and competitive market. In a higher-tier city, 
due to the higher levels of market competition, there is also higher information asymmetry 
and transparency. We create a dummy variable TIER_1_CITY, which is coded as “1” if the 
project is located in either a first-tier city or a new first-tier city, “0” otherwise. 
Appreciation. Following Bulan et al. (2009), we use the change in housing price to control 
for expected price appreciation. Instead of using the change rate of one-quarter-ahead 
expected housing price and current housing price, we calculate the appreciation rate by 
dividing the average selling price of a commercial house in the current year by the average 
selling price of a commercial house in the previous year, and then subtracting one. The 
housing price data is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China. It is on a 
nationwide-annual basis and is adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index 
(2000=100). The variable is denoted as APPRECIATION and it is expressed as a 
percentage. 
Price level. Following Wang et al. (2016), we use the housing price as a control for market 
situation. This is necessary because the data in this paper has a long time span (13 years) 
covering 49 cities. The variable is calculated as the median of the average selling price for 
each project on a citywide-annual basis, denoted as PRICE_LEVEL. The price is adjusted 
for inflation using Consumer Price Index (2000=100). 
Other controls. We include several hedonic variables to control for different characteristics 
among different projects. DOMESTIC controls for the sales areas and is equal to “1” if the 
project is sold domestically only, “0” otherwise. DECORATION controls for the decoration 
condition of the project and is equal to “1” if the apartments in the project are decorated, ”0” 
otherwise. MIXED_BUILDING controls for the building type of the project and is equal to “1” 
if the project contains more than one type of building (e.g. low-rise building and high-rise 
building), “0” otherwise. PHASED controls for the phasing strategy of a project and is equal 
to “1” if the project is phased, “0” otherwise. VILLA controls for the property type of the 
project and is equal to “1” if the project is a villa or townhouse (luxury properties), “0” 
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otherwise. PLOT_RATIO is calculated as the gross floor area (GFA) divided by project plot 
area. GREEN_RATIO represents the ratio of public green space to the plot area of the 
project. GFA represents the gross floor area of a project. 
Given the above variables, the baseline model in this paper can be written as:  
ℎ("|<=) = ℎ1(")>?@{BD#EFG#_IJKL!= + BM!NGO_1_IN!P= + BQE''OGINE!NJL= 
      +BR'ONIG_FGSGF= + BTUJVG#!NI= + BWUGIJOE!NJL= + BXVN<GU_YKNFUNLZ= 						+B\']E#GU= + BD1SNFFE= + BDD'FJ!_OE!NJ= + BDMZOGGL_OE!NJ= + BDQZ*E=} 
Figure 2 shows the number of projects and average selling price on a citywide basis (in 
order of tier 1 cities, new tier 1 cities and other cities).  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 shows that tier 1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou) account for 51% 
of the full sample size. Because tier 1 cities are the most developed cities are in mainland 
China, the average housing price of tier 1 cities (7282 yuan/sq.m) is significantly higher than 
that of new tier 1 cities’ (5500 yuan/sq.m) and other cities’ (3890 yuan/sq.m). This simply 
suggests a positive relationship between housing prices and the development level of the 
cities. 
Because the duration model prohibits multiple events by the same developer within the 
same time interval, in this paper each project is treated as an independent event. It is 
assumed that decisions to launch public sales are made by different managers, especially 
for projects from the same developer and for different phases of the same project. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of variables outlined above. The explanatory variables 
are classified into three categories: (i) herd parameter testing the herd behavior, (ii) market 
characteristics including city level and housing price, (iii) hedonic variables for the projects. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. In the full sample, the average time that a project 
takes from the commencement of construction to the launch of public sales is 12 months, 
with a median time of 8 months. We further plot a more visualized survival probability curve 
in Figure 3. It shows that half of the projects take less than 8 months to launch public sales, 
and 75% of them take less than 14 months. The shortest time to sale is only 1 month and 
the longest time to sale is 169 months. The slope of the survival probability curve indicates a 
significant cluster of public sales decisions not long after the beginning of construction, while 
it gets more dispersive as time goes on.  
[Insert Table 2 here]  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
For a typical project, the average number of projects that launch public sales 3 months prior 
to it and within a 5-mile radius is nearly 10, while the average number of projects developed 
by top 500 developers drops to 0.6 and the average number of projects developed by public 
developers further drops to 0.5. In the full sample, 80% of the projects are located in either 
tier 1 or new tier 1 city, indicating a hotter property market in more developed cities.  
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among all the variables used in this paper. The results 
show a moderate positive linear correlation between TIER_1_CITY and PRICE_LEVEL. This 
is because PRICE_LEVEL is created on a citywide-annual basis, and since TIER_1_CITY 
differentiates the development level of cities, a more developed city is intuitively associated 
with a higher housing price. In addition, there is also a strong linear correlation between the 
three herd parameters (SALES_COUNT, TOP500_COUNT and PUBLIC_COUNT) but these 
variables will be tested individually in different regressions. Other absolute values of pairwise 
correlation coefficients are all under 0.3, suggesting there is little concern on multicollinearity. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
6.2 Baseline specification: Hypothesis 1 
Table 4 shows the empirical results for hypothesis 1. Recall that in the proportional hazard 
model, the effect of an estimated coefficient on the hazard rate is exponential. Therefore for 
each estimated coefficient B, the effect on hazard rate is >^, holding all else constant. A 
positive B means an increase in the variable has a positive impact on the hazard rate, which 
means it accelerates the probability that an event happens; a negative B means an increase 
in the variable delays the probability that an event happens. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We first test the impact of herd parameter in column (1). Next, we add market characteristics 
in column (2), then all hedonic variables together in column (3). Column (1)-(3) are based on 
our baseline model. In all the three regressions, SALES_COUNT has a significant positive 
effect on the time a project takes from construction commencement to launching public sales. 
The results in baseline model show that the likelihood that a project launches public sales 
increases by 1.2% with one more project launching public sales prior to it within 3 months 
and within a 5-mile radius. This result is consistent with the idea that competition accelerates 
development decisions (Bulan et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2016). Furthermore, the significant 
positive coefficient of TIER_1_CITY shows that in a more developed city (tier 1 city or new 
tier 1 city), developers choose to sell their projects 28% faster than those in less developed 
cities.  
This result is in line with the “informational herding” theory. When the city is more developed, 
the competition there is fiercer, thus increasing the transparency of information. For a typical 
developer, the “option to wait” cannot provide much value given that the developer already 
benefits from the information spillover and informational externalities. On the contrary, for a 
typical developer in less developed cities, where the competition is less fierce and the 
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information in market is less transparent, the “option to wait” provides more value when 
dealing with market uncertainty.  
Lastly, the significant positive coefficient of APPRECIATION indicates that a one percentage 
point increase in housing price in the previous year accelerates the decisions to launch 
public sales by 79%. Rising prices can provide capital gains for developers to overcome 
liquidity constraints, so the expected housing price appreciation might lead to a higher 
hazard rate (Bulan et al., 2009).  
6.3 Herding under different time period and distance: Hypothesis 2 
To test hypothesis 2, we modify the construction of herd parameter SALES_COUNT to see if 
herd behavior is more pronounced when the distance between a typical project and the 
project that launched public sales prior to it is shorter and when the time period between the 
two public sales dates is shorter. Following Bulan et al. (2009), we reconstruct 
SALES_COUNT with different distances and time periods. Recall that in the baseline model, 
SALES_COUNT is defined as the number of projects that launch public sales before project 4 in the previous 3 months and within a 5-mile radius. We create three new SALES_COUNT 
parameters with 3 months and 10-mile radius, 6 months and 5-mile radius, and 6 months 
and 10-mile radius. The results are shown in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In column (2), the effect of SALES_COUNT is still positive and significant, but due to the 
greater distance between projects, the extent of the effect is reduced. The likelihood that a 
project launches public sales drops from 1.2% to 0.7% with one more project launching 
public sales within a 10-mile radius. Similarly, the likelihood that a project launches public 
sales drops from 1.2% to 0.7% with one more project launching public sales 6 months prior 
to it, as shown in column (3). Not surprisingly, the coefficient in column (4) shows the least 
herding effect. When the time period is extended to 6 months and the distance is extended 
to 10 miles, the increase of one project taking public sales actions can only lead to a 0.4% 
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higher probability that other projects will also start to sell. These results strongly support 
hypothesis 2. 
6.4 Reputation: Hypothesis 3 
Because people tend to accept and spread the information more quickly if it comes from 
someone trustful (Shiller, 1995), we test hypothesis 3 by using herd parameters representing 
different levels of reputation (TOP500_COUNT, PUBLIC_COUNT). In the full sample, there 
are 458 projects that are developed by developers from the “Top 500” list, and 397 projects 
that are developed by public developers. Intuitively, a public developer has a higher 
reputation and greater influence than a “Top 500” developer because of the higher standard 
they need to meet to be public. The results are shown in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In column (2), compared with baseline model, TOP500_COUNT has a significantly greater 
effect on the propensity that a project will launch public sales. The action of public sales is 
accelerated by 6.1% with one more “Top 500” project launching public sales in the past 3 
months within 5 miles. When it comes to public developers, the effect is even greater. In 
column (3), an increase in PUBLIC_SALES leads to a 6.5% increase in the probability of 
public sales actions. These results strongly support hypothesis 3 that herd behavior is more 
pronounced when the lead developers are reputable. 
6.5 Robustness tests 
6.5.1 Herd behavior across cities 
In the baseline model, we differentiate the level of cities by adding a dummy variable 
TIER_1_CITY, which captures the difference in the value of “option to wait” in developed 
cities versus less developed cities. To further test the herd behavior across cities, we create 
a sub-sample containing projects located only in “tier 1 cities” (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou). We also create another sub-sample containing projects located in Beijing 
because it is the capital city and because housing prices in Beijing have always represented 
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the highest housing price level in China. Most importantly, neighborhood areas in Beijing are 
clearly separated by the “ring roads” which depict the urbanization process. The results are 
shown in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The coefficient of SALES_COUNT in the first column suggests that in tier 1 cities, the 
propensity of launching public sales for a project is increased by 1.3% with one more project 
launching public sales, which is higher than in the baseline model. In the second column, we 
add a categorical variable RING to control for the geographical position of the project in 
Beijing. Beijing is one of the few cities that possess multiple ring roads, with a lower ring 
road that is closer to the city center. In this paper, we define RING = 4 as the project is 
located between the 40_and (4 + 1)0_ ring roads. The coefficient of SALES_COUNT still 
shows a strong herd behavior and the herd effect is greater than that of tier 1 cities. In 
Beijing, the propensity of a project taking sales action is increased by 1.7% when there is 
one more project taking sales action 3 months prior to it within 5 miles. The changes in the 
coefficients of SALES_COUNT suggest that in a more competitive market, the herd behavior 
of launching public sales is more pronounced.  
For coefficients of variable RING, the projects beyond the 60_ ring road (RING = 6) are the 
benchmark. The coefficients show that the value of “option to wait” is significantly higher for 
projects located within the 60_ring road than beyond the 60_ ring road, but there is no evident 
pattern across the ring roads. Wang et al. (2016) find that higher land prices accelerate 
development, while in this paper, the result is opposite. Projects within the 60_ ring road tend 
to delay public sales compared with projects beyond the 60_ ring road. The underlying 
reason may be that because Beijing is the capital of China, stricter land-use regulation 
causes development decisions to take longer for projects closer to city center. Besides, due 
to high housing prices, few people can afford a new house close to city center, thus making 
the suburban housing market more popular.  
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6.5.2 Herding with different reputation concerns 
In reputational herding theory, decision makers tend to mimic others’ decisions because 
being consistent with the majority makes them feel more sensible. However, the extent of 
reputational herding varies among decision makers with different reputation concerns. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) find that less skilled managers have higher reputation concerns 
and benefit more from herding. Brown et al. (2006) also conclude that less reputable 
managers exhibit a greater tendency to herd. Therefore, we divide the full sample into two 
separate sub-samples containing projects developed by public developers and projects 
developed by non-public developers. We then test the effect of PUBLIC_COUNT on time to 
launch public sales in each sub-sample to see whether the effect is different between two 
groups. The results are shown in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The coefficient in the second column shows that for projects developed by non-public 
developers, the propensity for them to launch public sales increases by 1.7% when there is 
one more project where a public developer has launched public sales 3 months prior and 
within 5 miles. However, for projects developed by public developers, the effect of 
PUBLIC_COUNT is insignificant. This finding is consistent with the idea that the herd 
behavior is more pronounced for less reputable decision makers than reputable decision 
makers. 
6.5.3 Single-phased development versus development with multiple phases  
Except for delaying development and preselling projects, development by phases (phasing 
strategy) is also commonly used by real estate developers to deal with market uncertainty. 
When faced with market demand uncertainty, developers tend to lower the price in earlier 
units to make sure there is sufficient demand, then sequentially increase the price in later 
phases when the market demand is clearer (Lai et al., 2004). Tang and Wang (2017) find a 
significant acceleration effect of competition on projects that are single-phase, while the 
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effect is not significant for phased projects as a whole. To test if the herding effect is different 
between projects adopting a phasing strategy and projects without a phasing strategy, we 
create two sub-samples containing phased and single-phase projects separately. The results 
are shown in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In the multi-phased projects group, the coefficient of SALES_COUNT does not have a 
significant effect on the developers’ selling decisions, whereas in the single-phase projects 
group, an increase in SALES_COUNT leads to a 1.3% rise in the propensity that a project 
takes a selling action. The results are in line with Tang and Wang’s findings. For phased 
projects, the demand uncertainty has been largely reduced by selling the first units, so the 
information spillover does not have much benefit. However, for single-phase projects, the 
demand uncertainty still exists, so developers have higher incentives to follow others’ 
decisions, and therefore the herding effect is more pronounced. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper explores herd behavior in developers’ public launch decisions in China’s housing 
market. The empirical results strongly support the hypotheses and provide new evidence for 
existing theories. First, a sales launch decision can be accelerated by the number of 
previous sales launches. The effect is more pronounced when the time interval between two 
sales dates is shorter and when the distance between two project sites is shorter. In addition, 
developers have a higher tendency to herd when the lead developers are reputable. These 
findings are in line with the theory of informational herding and reputational herding, they 
also show that competition can accelerate developers’ sales launch decisions. 
The herding patterns of different groups are examined in further robustness tests. Results 
show that herd behavior is more evident in more competitive markets, among less reputable 
developers, and in projects without a phasing strategy. 
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This paper also has some implications from a policy perspective. In China, real estate sector 
has been a strategic focus in economic development since 1998 and the government usually 
implements short-term policies to deal with temporary fluctuations in the housing market. 
The findings in this paper can help policymakers have a better understanding of the herd 
behavior in sales launch decisions among developers. This enables policymakers to 
implement more efficient policy measures to help maintain a healthy and stable housing 
market. 
One limitation of this paper is that the data is more concentrated in higher-tier cities due to 
the nature of the existing data set. In addition, the effect of factors on developers’ decisions 
to launch public sales are examined individually. In the future, it would be interesting to test 
the combined effect of factors and herd behavior in lower-tier cities. It is also worth 
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Figure 1: Number and average price of projects on an annual basis 
 
This figure shows the number of projects and the average price of projects in the full sample 




























Figure 2: Number and average price of projects on a citywide basis 
 
This figure shows the number of projects and the average price of projects in the full sample 
(1997-2009) on a citywide basis. The first four cities are tier 1 cities, then followed by new 




























Figure 3: Survival probability curve of time to launch public sales 
 
This figure shows the survival probability curve of time to launch public sales. Time to launch 
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TIME_TO_SALE The time that a project takes from construction commencement to public 
sales (in months) 
Herd parameter 
SALES_COUNT Number of same-city projects that launches public sales in previous 3 
months within a 5-mile radius for project 4 
TOP500_COUNT Number of same-city projects developed by top 500 developers that 
launches public sales in previous 3 months within a 5-mile radius for project 4 
PUBLIC_COUNT Number of same-city projects developed by public developers that 
launches public sales in previous 3 months within a 5-mile radius for project 4 
Market characteristics 
TIER_1_CITY Dummy, =1 if the project is located in either first-tier or new first-tier city 
APPRECIATION The annual average commercial houses price change compared to 
previous year on a national basis (%) 
PRICE_LEVEL The average commercial houses price on a year-city basis (in logarithm) 
Hedonic variables 
DOMESTIC Dummy, =1 if the project is sold in domestic market only 
DECORATION Dummy, =1 if the project is decorated 
MIXED_BUILDING Dummy, =1 if the project contains at least two types of buildings (eg. villa 
and low-rise building, medium-rise building and high-rise building) 
PHASED Dummy, =1 if the project is phased 
VILLA Dummy, =1 if the property type is villa 
PLOT_RATIO The plot ratio of the project, defined as the gross floor area (GFA) of the 
project divided by the area of the plot 
GREEN_RATIO Ratio of green space, defined as the ratio of public green space to the plot 
area of the property (%) 








This table reports the summary statistics for all variables in the full sample. Variables 
APPRECIATION and PRICE_LEVEL are adjusted for inflation (2000=100). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Variables Obs Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile Std. Dev 
TIME_TO_SALE 6930 12 8 5 14 13 
SALES_COUNT 6930 9.61 6 3 13 10.3 
TOP500_COUNT 6930 0.592 0 0 1 1.01 
PUBLIC_COUNT 6930 0.516 0 0 1 0.925 
TIER_1_CITY 6930 0.807 1 1 1 0.395 
APPRECIATION 6930 0.054 0.045 0.025 0.095 0.066 
PRICE_LEVEL 6925 8.65 8.7 8.34 8.98 0.419 
DOMESTIC 6930 0.824 1 1 1 0.381 
DECORATION 6930 0.287 0 0 1 0.452 
MIXED_BUILDING 6930 0.235 0 0 0 0.424 
PHASED 6930 0.071 0 0 0 0.257 
VILLA 6930 0.049 0 0 0 0.216 
PLOT_RATIO 5415 3.12 2.48 1.6 3.8 2.33 
GREEN_RATIO 5713 38 46.2 30 41.5 11 





This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of all the variables in the full sample. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at  
0.1%.
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Time to Sale 
 
1.000 
              
Sales Count 0.110*** 1.000              
Top500 Count -0.025 0.497*** 1.000             
Public Count -0.025 0.570*** 0.753*** 1.000            
Tier 1 City 0.004 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 1.000           
Appreciation -0.010 -0.089*** 0.001 -0.018 0.001 1.000          
Price Level 0.166*** 0.096*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.492*** 0.164*** 1.000         
Domestic -0.035* 0.154*** 0.057*** 0.101*** 0.157*** -0.009 0.245*** 1.000        
Decoration 0.041** 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.017 0.127*** 0.044** 1.000       
Mixed Building 0.001 -0.065*** -0.014 -0.011 -0.068*** 0.067*** 0.014 -0.012 -0.121*** 1.000      
Phased 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.043** 0.117*** 0.052*** -0.011 0.080*** 1.000     
Villa 0.068*** -0.071*** -0.050*** -0.029* 0.047** 0.019 0.100*** 0.028 -0.037* -0.083*** 0.004 1.000    
Plot Ratio -0.019 0.143*** 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.095*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.020 0.098*** -0.237*** 0.071*** 0.231*** 1.000   
Green Ratio 0.041** 0.001 0.036* 0.034* 0.026 0.001 0.084*** 0.022 -0.064*** 0.120*** 0.095*** 0.281*** -0.296*** 1.000  
GFA 0.173*** -0.154*** 0.001 -0.022 -0.091*** 0.036* 0.082*** -0.048*** -0.033* 0.239*** 0.058*** 0.045** -0.134*** 0.167*** 1.000 
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Table 4  
Hazard regression: Hypothesis 1 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the full sample. Reg. 
(1) tests the herd parameter. Reg. (2) tests herd parameter and market characteristics. Reg. 
(3) tests all variables, which is also the baseline regression. The estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) = ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. Coefficients are reported in real form (.) and one unit change in %& 
leads to a (*0 − 1) percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 
1%; *** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 Reg. (1) Reg. (2) Reg. (3) 
   Baseline 
Sales Count 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 (11.51) (12.32) (7.54) 
    
Tier 1 City  0.177*** 0.250*** 
  (4.73) (5.17) 
    
Appreciation  0.251 0.583** 
  (1.52) (3.07) 
    
Price Level  -0.465*** -0.541*** 
  (-13.41) (-12.16) 
    
Domestic   0.160*** 
   (3.88) 
    
Decoration   -0.059 
   (-1.76) 
    
Mixed Building   0.079* 
   (2.25) 
    
Phased   -0.150** 
   (-2.73) 
    
Villa   -0.249*** 
   (-3.50) 
    
Plot Ratio   -0.028*** 
   (-3.78) 
    
Green Ratio   0.001 
   (0.38) 
    
GFA   -0.132*** 
   (-9.14) 





Hazard regression: Hypothesis 2 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the full sample. Reg. 
(1) is the baseline regression. In Reg. (2), Reg. (3) and Reg. (4), the herd parameter 
SALES_COUNT are calculated using 3 months and 10 miles, 6 months and 5 miles, 6 
months and 10 miles separately. The estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) = ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. 
Coefficients are reported in real form (.) and one unit change in %& leads to a (*0 − 1) 
percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 
0.1%. 
 













Sale Count 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (7.54) (8.66) (7.50) (8.82) 
     
Tier 1 City 0.250*** 0.225*** 0.248*** 0.223*** 
 (5.17) (4.61) (5.12) (4.56) 
     
Appreciation 0.583** 0.623** 0.583** 0.624** 
 (3.07) (3.26) (3.07) (3.26) 
     
Price Level -0.541*** -0.564*** -0.549*** -0.577*** 
 (-12.16) (-12.57) (-12.33) (-12.80) 
     
Domestic 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.161*** 0.146*** 
 (3.88) (3.54) (3.93) (3.53) 
     
Decoration -0.059 -0.071* -0.060 -0.073* 
 (-1.76) (-2.11) (-1.79) (-2.14) 
     
Mixed Building 0.079* 0.081* 0.077* 0.079* 
 (2.25) (2.30) (2.19) (2.24) 
     
Phased -0.150** -0.155** -0.153** -0.165** 
 (-2.73) (-2.83) (-2.79) (-3.00) 
     
Villa -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.245*** -0.241*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.44) (-3.45) (-3.40) 
     
Plot Ratio -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.45) (-3.81) (-3.47) 
     
Green Ratio 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.38) (0.18) (0.38) (0.16) 
     
GFA -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.128*** 
 (-9.14) (-8.98) (-9.00) (-8.86) 





Hazard regression: Hypothesis 3 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the full sample. Reg. 
(1) is the baseline regression. In Reg. (2) and Reg. (3), the herd parameter is 
TOP500_COUNT and PUBLIC_COUNT separately. The estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) = ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. Coefficients are reported in real form (.) and one unit change in %& 
leads to a (*0 − 1) percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 
1%; *** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 Reg. (1) Reg. (2) Reg. (3) 




Sales Count 0.012***   
 (7.54)   
    
Top500 Count  0.059***  
  (3.96)  
    
Public Count   0.064*** 
   (3.77) 
    
Tier 1 City 0.250*** 0.264*** 0.258*** 
 (5.17) (5.47) (5.35) 
    
Appreciation 0.583** 0.485** 0.487** 
 (3.07) (2.60) (2.61) 
    
Price Level -0.541*** -0.557*** -0.553*** 
 (-12.16) (-12.50) (-12.45) 
    
Domestic 0.160*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 
 (3.88) (4.79) (4.66) 
    
Decoration -0.059 -0.057 -0.056 
 (-1.76) (-1.69) (-1.67) 
    
Mixed Building 0.079* 0.068 0.069 
 (2.25) (1.94) (1.94) 
    
Phased -0.150** -0.123* -0.121* 
 (-2.73) (-2.26) (-2.21) 
    
Villa -0.249*** -0.282*** -0.289*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.99) (-4.08) 
    
Plot Ratio -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.36) (-3.33) 
    
Green Ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.38) (0.76) (0.74) 
    
GFA -0.132*** -0.146*** -0.144*** 
 (-9.14) (-10.17) (-10.06) 





Hazard regression: Robustness test 1 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the subsamples. Reg. 
(1) uses data from tier 1 cities. Reg. (2) uses data from Beijing. RING = 3 is defined as the 
project is located between the 345and (3 + 1)45 ring roads. The estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) = ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. Coefficients are reported in real form (.) and one unit change in %& 
leads to a (*0 − 1) percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 
1%; *** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 Reg. (1) Reg. (2) 
 Tier 1 cities Beijing 
Sales Count 0.013*** 0.017** 
 (6.91) (3.14) 
   
Appreciation 0.212 0.091 
 (0.69) (0.19) 
   
Price Level -0.663*** -0.626*** 
 (-7.85) (-3.77) 
   
Domestic 0.318** 0.293 
 (2.76) (1.95) 
   
Decoration -0.101* -0.018 
 (-2.31) (-0.26) 
   
Mixed Building 0.174*** -0.016 
 (3.35) (-0.12) 
   
Phased -0.089 -0.172 
 (-1.35) (-1.34) 
   
Villa -0.084 -0.270 
 (-0.89) (-1.64) 
   
Plot Ratio -0.011 -0.018 
 (-1.13) (-1.15) 
   
Green Ratio -0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.76) (-1.46) 
   
GFA -0.105*** -0.093** 
 (-5.25) (-3.08) 
   
ring=1  -0.753*** 
  (-4.23) 
   
ring=2  -0.516*** 
  (-3.32) 
   
ring=3  -0.592*** 
  (-3.92) 
   
ring=4  -0.570*** 
  (-3.92) 
   
ring=5  -0.577*** 
  (-4.10) 





Hazard regression: Robustness test 2 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the subsamples. Reg. 
(1) uses data from projects developed by public developers. Reg. (2) uses data from projects 
developed by non-public developers. The estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) =ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. Coefficients are reported in real form (.) and one unit change in %& leads to a 
(*0 − 1) percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** 
Significant at 0.1%. 
 





Public Count 0.110 0.059*** 
 (1.73) (3.38) 
   
Tier 1 City -0.434 0.287*** 
 (-1.78) (5.79) 
   
Appreciation 0.393 0.494* 
 (0.60) (2.52) 
   
Price Level -0.554** -0.564*** 
 (-2.95) (-12.28) 
   
Domestic 0.115 0.202*** 
 (0.64) (4.80) 
   
Decoration -0.009 -0.054 
 (-0.07) (-1.54) 
   
Mixed Building 0.231 0.059 
 (1.61) (1.61) 
   
Phased 0.160 -0.134* 
 (0.72) (-2.36) 
   
Villa -0.201 -0.290*** 
 (-0.68) (-3.97) 
   
Plot Ratio 0.052 -0.028*** 
 (1.40) (-3.73) 
   
Green Ratio -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.21) (0.63) 
   
GFA -0.274*** -0.134*** 
 (-4.89) (-8.82) 






Hazard regression: Robustness test 3 
 
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model in the subsamples. Reg. 
(1) uses data from phased projects. Reg. (2) uses data from single-phase projects. The 
estimated hazard model is ℎ(#|%&) = ℎ)(#)*+,{%&.}. Coefficients are reported in real form (.) 
and one unit change in %& leads to a (*0 − 1) percent change in hazard rate ℎ # . * 
Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%. 
 
 Reg. (1) Reg. (2) 
 Phased Single-phase 
Sales Count 0.004 0.013*** 
 (0.80) (7.74) 
   
Tier 1 City 0.803*** 0.213*** 
 (3.72) (4.26) 
   
Appreciation 1.833* 0.482* 
 (2.32) (2.46) 
   
Price Level -0.770*** -0.529*** 
 (-4.21) (-11.51) 
   
Domestic -0.015 0.165*** 
 (-0.08) (3.91) 
   
Decoration 0.072 -0.063 
 (0.54) (-1.79) 
   
Mixed Building 0.187 0.070 
 (1.54) (1.88) 
   
Villa -0.143 -0.242** 
 (-0.55) (-3.28) 
   
Plot Ratio -0.000 -0.029*** 
 (-0.00) (-3.86) 
   
Green Ratio 0.000 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.31) 
   
GFA -0.139* -0.132*** 
 (-2.32) (-8.78) 
Observations 375 4377 
 
